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I.

Introduction and Summary of Conclusions∗

A. Issues
This memorandum addresses the crime against humanity of persecution under the
statutes of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (“ICTY”) and
the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (“ICTR”) and whether the wording of
these statutes prevents conviction for persecution of ethnic and national minorities.
Section III of this memorandum addresses the precedents within the tribunals and how
these have affected the interpretation of the Statutes. Section IV of this memorandum
examines the effect of concurrent jurisdiction and universal jurisdiction on the ability to
obtain a conviction for persecution.

Section V of this memorandum discusses the

practical realities of the Tribunals regarding the overlap of definitions of minorities and
the way convictions for persecution have been obtained in past trials before the Tribunals.
Section VI of this memorandum discusses the ability of the Tribunal to apply any treaties
to which Rwanda was a party.
B. Summary of Conclusions
(1) Precedents From the Appeals Chambers of the Tribunals Allow the
Crime of Persecution to be Stretched to Include Ethnic and National
Minorities.
The crime of persecution requires a discriminatory intent similar to that required
by the crime of genocide under the statutes of the ICTR and ICTY. Although the Statutes
criminalize genocide based only on racial, religious, ethnic, or national grounds, the trial
∗

ISSUE: Does the phrase “on political, racial, or religious grounds” in Article 3(h) of the ICTR statute and
5(h) of the ICTY statute foreclose conviction based on persecution against ethnic or national minorities?
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chamber in the Akayesu case held that the genocide portion of the statute should be
interpreted as protecting any stable and permanent group.1

The Statute must be

interpreted in this way in order to respect the intention of the drafters of the statute.
Similarly, the Appeals chamber of the ICTY reasoned that “it is the substance of
relations between the parties, not their legal characterization, which is controlling”2 for
Grave Breaches of the Geneva Conventions. The court found that it does not matter if
perpetrators and victims are both technically of the same nationality, the court could find
that the victims were “protected persons”.
Given the similarities in the discriminatory intent required for both genocide and
persecution, the court should apply the standards demonstrated in these precedents to
future cases involving persecution.
(2) Based on Both Concurrent Jurisdiction and Universal Jurisdiction, the
Tribunal Could Allow the National Courts to Bring the Charges for
Persecution.
The ICTR has concurrent jurisdiction with the national courts of Rwanda
although primary jurisdiction remains within the ICTR. However, it is allowable under
the statute for the ICTR to surrender a prisoner to the national courts for prosecution if
the prosecutor wishes to allow it. The only requirement is that a defendant cannot be
prosecuted for the same offense in both courts.

A problem could develop if the

1

Prosecutor v. Akayesu, (Case no. ICTR-96-4-T), Judgment, 37 I.L.M. 1399, 1573. (In the first
international prosecution for the crime of Genocide). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab
10.]
2

Kelly D. Askin, Judgments Rendered in 1999 By the International Criminal Tribunals for the Former
Yugoslavia and for Rwanda: Tadic; Aleksovski; Jelisic; Ruzindana & Kayishema; Serushago; Rutaganda,
6 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 485, 491 (2000). (Discussing the interpretation of nationality for Grave
Breaches of the Geneva Conventions in the Tadic case). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at
Tab 35.]
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underlying offense of the persecution consisted of one or more of the offenses that the
defendant is charged with in the ICTR.
The national laws of the country in question are possibly an obstacle to the
national courts asserting jurisdiction over a case involving persecution. The national
courts cannot normally take jurisdiction for acts which were not violations of the law of
the nation. However, if the violation is subject to universal jurisdiction, as crimes against
humanity often are, the national court of Rwanda could take jurisdiction over the criminal
acts. However, the individual acts that comprise the persecution may not be subject to
universal jurisdiction.
(3) Given the Unclear Definitions of the Protected Groups Under the Crime
of Persecution, the Courts Have Consistently Convicted for Persecution of
Groups Which Are Arguably Ethnic or National.
In examining the past judgments of both the ICTY and ICTR, it is clear that
despite the Tribunals’ difficulty in clearly defining the protected groups as listed under
persecution in their corresponding statutes, they have been willing to bring convictions
for groups that could be seen as ethnic or national by defining them as a group which
falls under the language of the statute.
This can be seen in cases in which the ICTY convicts for the persecution of
Bosnian Croats by Bosnian Serbs by referring to them as racial groups and a conviction
of a Hutu for the persecution of Tutsis and Belgians on racial grounds. In the case of the
Bosnian Croats and the Tutsis, the Tribunals suggest the interchangeability of these
definitions by referring to the victims as members of ethnic groups throughout the
judgment, until reaching the judgment on the charge of persecution, at which time they

4

refer to the charge as being on racial grounds. Furthermore, the history of Rwanda makes
it quite possible that the persecution of Belgians had occurred due to the nature of
Belgium’s involvement in the country, rather than for racial reasons. This precedent
makes it seem likely that the distinctions between various groups are merely academic in
nature and those members of an unprotected group will almost always fall under a
protected group as well.
(4)

The Tribunal is Able to Apply the Law of Any Treaties to Which

Rwanda Was a Party.
The International Tribunal may apply the law of any treaties that were binding
upon the conflicting parties at the time of the act in question. This would allow
conviction in the Tribunal for the acts which would constitute persecution if the charges
were being brought under the Statute.

II.

Factual Background
The tensions between the Hutu and Tutsi “ethnic” groups date back to the 1500’s,

when the Tutsis first arrived in the region now known as Rwanda.3 In this setting, a
common culture and language developed. The distinction between the Hutu and Tutsi
was developed as a socio-economic distinction which allowed some mobility between the
groups. This mobility could be performed through the acquisition of cattle. By the early
20th century, “a Hutu was classified as anyone with fewer than ten cows.”4 The break

3

Mariann Meier Wang, The International Tribunal for Rwanda: Opportunities for Clarification,
Opportunities for Impact, COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 177, 179 (1995). [Reproduced in the accompanying
notebook at Tab 50.]
4

Id.

5

down of the population of Rwanda was approximately 85% of the country Hutu, and 14%
Tutsi with the remaining portion of the population consisting of Twa.
In 1916, Belgium occupied Rwanda as a result of the campaign against Germany
during World War I. In administering Rwanda, the Belgians made use of the existing
social structure, which consisted of the minority Tutsis as a ruling class. The Belgians
reinforced the distinctions between the two groups, which had previously been much
weaker, thereby destroying their flexibility.5 In this way, the Belgians in effect created an
“ethnic group”. During the years of 1945-61, Belgium began to support a greater degree
of power-sharing within Rwanda, believing that minority rule within the country was
unsustainable.6 As the Hutus gained greater political power, Rwanda saw an increase in
violence against the Tutsis, which led many to flee the country. By 1961, Belgium
withdrew from Rwanda, allowing the country to transform from a “Tutsi-dominated
monarchy to a Hutu-led republic”.7 This transition led to “a cycle of turbulent clashes for
power, where “capture of the Rwandan state from political opponents has been a violent
zero-sum game in which the winner takes all”.8
Following the death of the President of Rwanda in 1994, members of the Hutu
majority began a series of attacks on the Tutsi minority as well as Hutu moderates who
favored the sharing of political power. These attacks were apparently planned in advance
5

Linda Maquire, Power Ethnicized: The Pursuit of Protection and Participation in Rwanda and Burundi, 2
BUFF. J. INT’L L. 49, 51 (1995). (This is important for the analysis of “permanent and stable” groups).
[Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 41.]

6

Wang, supra note 3, at 180.

7

C. SCHELTMAN AND W. VAN DER WOLF [editors]. THE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA: FACTS,
CASES, AND DOCUMENTS. Vol. 1: The Facts 37 (1999). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab
33.]
8

Id.

6

of the plane crash and motivated by ethnic hatred.9 During the three month span that
these attacks took place, an estimated 500,000 to 1 million people were killed. Following
this three month period, the Tutsis were able to overthrow the Hutu government. The
new government then requested that the United Nations to create an international war
crimes tribunal. The United Nations Security Council, with the recommendation of a
commission of experts, determined that serious breaches of international law had
occurred in Rwanda.10 On November 8, 1994, the Security Council decided that these
breaches constituted a threat to international peace and security within the scope of its
Chapter VII authority, and adopted Resolution 95511 This resolution established the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda.

III.

Precedent of Previous Judgments As Used to Expand the Grounds

For Charges of Persecution.
The grounds upon which the crime of persecution may be brought are limited
within the Statute of the ICTR to racial, religious, and political. However, the application
of previous interpretations of crimes that require a similar discriminatory intent or
protected groups may allow this charge to be expanded to include both ethnic and
national grounds. Among the crimes that have this similarity are genocide and grave
9

Mark R. Von Sternberg, A Comparison of the Yugoslavian and Rwandan War Crimes Tribunals:
Universal Jurisdiction and the “Elementary Dictates of Humanity”, 22 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 111, 128 (1996).
[Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 49.]

10

S.C. Res. 935, U.N. SCOR, 3400th mtg. at 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/935 (1994). (These breaches are later
reflected in the ICTR Statute) [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab B.]
11

International Criminal Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Genocide and Other
Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of Rwanda and Rwandan
Citizens Responsible For Genocide and Other Such Violations Committed in the Territory of Neighbouring
States, Between January 1, 1994 and December 31, 1994, S.C. Res. 955, annex, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess.,
3453 mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (1994). [Hereinafter ICTR Statute]. [Reproduced in the accompanying
notebook at Tab 1.]
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breaches of the Geneva Conventions. As these crimes have been expanded beyond the
plain meaning of the Statute, the crime of persecution can also.
A. Definitions of Persecution
The Crimes of genocide and persecutions have been codified many times over the
years within the statutes of the various international tribunals, in case law, and in
customary international law. The definitions of these crimes can be difficult to find, and
are not always consistent. The crime of persecution is different from most other crimes
against humanity as it does not exist in most domestic legal systems.12
The Charter of the International Military Tribunal (IMT) was the first instrument
to lay out the crime of persecution.13 As stated in this document, “…persecutions on
political, racial, or religious grounds in execution of or in connection with any crime
within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, whether or not in violation of the domestic law of
the country where perpetrated” were considered crimes against humanity.14 The crime of
persecution contained in the Nuremberg Charter was further developed in the Genocide
Convention.15 The subject-matter jurisdiction of the IMT was limited to those crimes that
were identified as violations of customary international law at that time.

12

Allison Marston Danner, Constructing a Hierarchy of Crimes in International Criminal Law Sentencing,
87 VA. L. REV. 415, 460 (2001). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 36.]

13

Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the European Axis, Aug.
8, 1945, 59 Stat. 1544, 82 U.N.T.S. 279. [Hereinafter Nuremberg Charter]. (Established to prosecute war
criminals from Nazi Germany who committed crimes against humanity against the Jewish people).
[Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 3.]

14

Id. at Art. 6(c). (This was an important factor as the actions that made up the persecutions in question
were within the law of Germany at the time).
15

1 VIRGINIA MORRIS AND MICHAEL SCHARF, AN INSIDER’S GUIDE TO THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA, A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY AND ANALYSIS 77 (1995)
[Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 29.].

8

The next occasion in which the crime of persecution was used was in the trials
held under Control Council Law No. 10 (Control Council).16 Under Article II section
1(c) of the Control Council Law, the following was recognized as a crime against
humanity: “persecutions on political, racial, or religious grounds whether or not in
violation of the domestic laws of the country where perpetrated”.17
Following World War II, the International Military Tribunal for the Far East was
established.18 Under Article 5 of this charter, one of the crimes against humanity within
the jurisdiction of the Tribunal was “persecutions on political or racial grounds in
execution of or in connection with any crime within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal,
whether or not in violation of the domestic law of the country where perpetrated”.19 The
most glaring difference between the grounds for persecution in past charters and in this
charter is the omission of persecution on religious grounds.20

This omission was

apparently due to the inapplicability to the Pacific Theatre of operation of religious
persecution because there was little evidence of persecutions on religious grounds in that
conflict21, thereby rendering it unnecessary in the statute.22
16

Control Council Law No. 10, available at http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/imt/imt10.htm (last visited
November 25, 2003). (Used for further prosecutions of Axis war criminals). [Reproduced in the
accompanying notebook at Tab 4.]

17

Id. at Art. II sec. 1(c).

18

Charter of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, Jan. 19, 1946, 4 Bevans 20, T.I.A.S. No.
1589 (amended Apr. 26, 1946, 4 Bevans 27). (Prosecuting Japanese war criminals). [Reproduced in the
accompanying notebook at Tab 5.]

19

Id. at Art. 5.

20

Id.

21

Darryl Robinson, Defining “Crimes Against Humanity” At the Rome Conference, 93 AM. J. INT’L L. 43,
FN 66. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 47.]
22

J. OPPENHEIMER AND W. VAN DER WOLF, GLOBAL WAR CRIMES TRIBUNAL COLLECTION; Vol. 2D 253
(1999). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 31.]

9

Article 5(h) of the ICTY Statute states that “persecutions on political, racial, and
religious grounds” are a crime against humanity.23 Similarly, the ICTR statute gives the
power to prosecute “persecutions on political, racial, or religious grounds”.24 However,
under the ICTR Statute, these crimes must be committed “as part of a widespread or
systematic attack against any civilian population on national, political, ethnic, racial, or
religious grounds,”25 a requirement which is missing from the previous statutes. The
negotiating record of the ICTY serves to shed light on the meaning of persecution within
the Statutes.

Italy recommended including persecutions on social, political, racial,

religious, or cultural grounds,26 as did the Organization of the Islamic Conference.27
Amnesty International suggested the prosecution of gross human rights violations
committed against any civilian population.28 The Russian Federation would limit the
scope of crimes against humanity to what was reflected in the IMT Charter.29 The United
States’ recommendation, which would usually be the most important for interpreting the

23

Statute of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of
International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991, U.N.
Doc. S/25704 at 36, annex (1993) and S/25704/Add. 1 (1993), adopted by Security Council on 25 May
1993, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (1993) [hereinafter ICTY Statute]. [Reproduced in the accompanying
notebook at Tab 2.]

24

ICTR Statute, supra note 11 at Art. 3.

25

Id. (This Chapeau requirement is only jurisdictional and does not add a further element to crimes against
humanity).

26

2 VIRGINIA MORRIS AND MICHAEL SCHARF, AN INSIDERS GUIDE TO THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA, A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY AND ANALYSIS 376 (1995)
[Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 30.]
27

Id. at 406.

28

Id. at 412.

29

Id. at 441.
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Statutes, does not include persecutions as a separate crime.30 Clearly, at least some of the
nations and organizations involved in drafting these statutes intended to include broader
protection than what was enumerated in the final draft.
The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court was drafted after the
creation of the ICTY and the ICTR, therefore this statute is not helpful for the purpose of
determining the intent of the Security Council in forming those tribunals. However, it is
useful for the purpose of determining what the present state of customary international
law regarding the crime of persecution is. According to the Rome Statute, the court has
jurisdiction over crimes against humanity which include “persecutions against any
identifiable group or collectivity on political, racial, national, ethnic, cultural, religious,
gender…, or other grounds that are universally recognized as impermissible under
international law…”31

This statute demonstrates that customary international law

prohibits persecutions based upon more grounds then merely those protected under prior
International Tribunals.
The lack of clarity regarding the definitions of both the acteus reas and the mens
rea of the crime of persecution has been pointed out many times by both courts and
commentators. As the ICTY has stated, “Persecution under Article 5(h) has never been
comprehensively defined in international treaties.

Furthermore, neither national nor

international case law provides an authoritative single definition of what constitutes
‘persecution’.32 Persecution has been defined as the “intentional and severe deprivation
30

Id. at 454.

31

Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 37 I.L.M. 999, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 183/ 9 (July 17,
1998). [Hereinafter ICC Statute]. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 6.]

32

Prosecutor v. Kupreskic, International Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, Case No. IT-95-16-T,
Judgment, para. 567. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 13.]
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of fundamental rights contrary to international law against any identifiable group of
collectivity on prohibited discriminatory grounds.”33 Acts enumerated in other subclauses of the Articles containing crimes against humanity can constitute persecution, as
can the consistent deprivation of a wide variety of rights including attacks on political,
social and economic rights.34 The ICTY has identified the following acts as persecution:
participation in attacks, forced transfer of civilians, deportation, the destruction of
property, and unlawful detention of civilians, among others.35
A substantial definition of what constitutes persecution remains unclear.
“Although the crime of persecution is recognized in the major precedents (the Nuremberg
and Tokyo Charters and the ICTY and ICTR Statutes), it was not defined”.36 Perhaps a
good starting point to determine rights that may be protected by criminalizing persecution
would be the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights37; the International
Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights38; and the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights39, although the deprivation of some of these rights may not rise to the level

33

Darryl Robinson, supra note 21 at 53. (Regarding the ICC Statute).

34

Prosecutor v. Kupreskic et al., supra note 32.
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Guenael Mettraux, Crimes Against Humanity in the Jurisprudence of the International Criminal
Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and for Rwanda, 43 HARV. INT’L L. J. 237, 292 (2002). [Reproduced
in accompanying notebook at Tab 42.].
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37

International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, U.N.T.S. No. 14668, vol. 999, (1976). [Reproduced
in the accompanying notebook at Tab 21]

38

International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, available at
http://www.vnhrnet.org/english/eintbill/ebill_econsocial.htm (last visited November 25, 2003).
[Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 22.]
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The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, available at http://www.un.org/Overview/rights.html (last
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of severity of the other crimes against humanity. The determination of whether a human
rights violation constitutes an international crime depends on the fundamental importance
of the right violated, and the level of magnitude of the violation.40
There is similar ambiguity regarding the grounds upon which the persecution
must be based. “The lists of acts considered ‘crimes against humanity’ not only vary from
definition to definition, but are sometimes qualified as illustrative and sometimes as
restrictive.”41 As has been stated, “[t]here is no definitive list of persecutory grounds in
customary international law.”42 Further evidence of the fact that there is no exhaustive
list of the grounds upon which persecutory conduct is prohibited under international law
is that although “the Nuremberg Charter and ICTY and ICTR Statutes include
persecution on ‘political, racial, or religious grounds,”43 “…as delegations wished to take
into account the evolution of international norms, the ICC statute builds on these
precedents by adding national, ethnic, and gender grounds, which were drawn from the
definition in the ICTR Statute.”44 The 1991 and 1996 I.L.C. Draft Code, which codifies
existing international law, contains the additional ground of ethnicity, while the original
1954 Draft Code included culture.45 The Canadian Criminal Code considers persecution
against “any civilian population or any identifiable group of persons” to be a crime

40

1 VIRGINIA MORRIS AND MICHAEL SCHARF, THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA, A
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY AND ANALYSIS (1996). [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 28].
41

Wang supra note 3 at 213.
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against humanity.46 Whatever, the precise definition of persecution, given the additional
requirement of a discriminatory intent, it is intended to be a very serious offense.47
B. Definitions of Genocide
The crime of genocide has been laid out in several international forums. In
addition to the case law and customary international law where the crimes fall under the
jurisdiction of the international tribunals, the crime of genocide is covered by a
multilateral treaty, the Genocide Convention.48

The definition of genocide under

customary international law is much easier to determine than that of persecution, and
would in fact seem quite clear. This definition is also codified within the Genocide
Convention49, and Article II of the Genocide Convention is reflected in the ICTY and
ICTR Statutes as well as the ICC Statute.50 “The Nuremberg Tribunal did not expressly
refer to the crime of genocide although the persecutions condemned in its judgment
clearly come under this crime.”51

The Genocide Convention is a more accurate

codification of customary international law and jus cogens norms than most multilateral
treaties.52 This is reflected in the International Court of Justice holding that
46

Prosecutor v. Kupreskic et al, supra note 32 at Footnote 841.

47

Danner, supra note 12 at 479.
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Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277
(1951) [hereinafter Genocide Convention], adopted by G.A. Res. 260(III) (A), U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., U.N>
Doc. A/810 (1948). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 20.]
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11 at art. 2.
51

MORRIS AND SCHARF, supra note 15 at 85.
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[t]he principles underlying the Convention are principles which are
recognized by civilized nations as binding on States, even without any
conventional obligation. These jus cogens obligations are held erga
omnes and extend to the entire world, not just to other signatories to the
Convention…Some sources indicate that the Convention itself falls under
customary international law. Others opine that it is not the treaty, but
rather the normative content of the rule prohibiting genocide as expressed
in Article II.53
This distinction would be important if the customary international law allows for broader
protection than what is included in the Convention. However, the most important point
for the purposes of the forthcoming analysis is that the crime of genocide is reflected in
some form through customary international law. The Genocide Convention defines
genocide as “any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in
part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such” and then goes on to give
several prohibited acts that are covered by the act.54 This Article is reproduced in the
ICTR and ICTY Statutes, with the only change being the term “ethnical” to the more
modern “ethnic”.55
Persecution as a crime against humanity is an offense belonging to the
same genus as genocide. Both persecution and genocide are crimes
perpetrated against persons that belong to a particular group and who are
targeted because of such belonging…Thus it can be said that, from the
viewpoint of men rea, genocide is an extreme and most inhuman form of
persecution.56
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Id. at 243.
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See Genocide Convention, supra note 48.
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ICTY Statute supra note 23 at art. 4; ICTR Statute supra note 11 at art. 2. (The change in terms is merely
modernization and does not reflect a change of definitions of the terms).
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Prosecutor v. Kupreskic et al, supra note 32 at para. 636.
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Also, according to the judgment in Prosecutor v. Kayishema the definition of the crime of
genocide is a combination of extermination and persecutions.57 The opinion has also been
put forth that “it was not necessary to include persecution in the list of inhumane acts…as
this inhumane act was covered by the definition of genocide.”58 An awareness of the
definition of genocide both within the Convention and in customary international law is
useful for examining the way that this offense has been interpreted by the Tribunals,
which can help to understand the ways in which persecution could be interpreted.
C. Interpretation and Extension of Crimes under the ICTR and ICTY
During the drafting process of the Genocide Convention, there were several
suggestions were made that did not make the final draft of the Convention. The original
conception of the crime of genocide was developed by Professor Raphael Lemkin in his
book, Axis Rule in Occupied Europe. “Lemkin’s concept of genocide…went from an
academic description to a firm principle of international law in just over four years.”59
Professor Lemkin created the term of genocide in 1944 in a comprehensive study of
atrocities by the Axis powers. Lemkin laid out several techniques of genocide, that he
believed represented a coordinated attack upon all aspects of nationhood: political, social,
cultural, economic, biological, physical, religious, and moral.60 By the final drafting of
the Genocide Convention, however, the definition of genocide was reduced to only the
killing of a population based upon the prohibited grounds, and the destruction of cultures
57

Prosecutor v. Kayishema Judgment Case No. ICTR-95-1-T (International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
II May 21, 1999) at para. 89. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 12.]
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RAPHAEL LEMKIN, AXIS RULE IN OCCUPIED EUROPE, 79-90, (1973) [Reproduced in the accompanying
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was removed from the definition. In fact, political groups were intentionally omitted from
the list of protected groups in the Convention.61 This shows that the Convention was
intentionally limited to the grounds which were listed in the final draft of the Convention.
However, the protected classes have been expanded through the judgments in
several cases before the two Tribunals. In the Akayesu case, in which a defendant was
charged with the crime of genocide in the ICTR, the trial chamber held that the groups
protected by the Genocide Convention are not limited to the four groups expressly
mentioned but also include any group which is stable and permanent similar to the four
groups.62 This reasoning is given support by the intentional omission of political groups,
which was done in part because they were considered to be mutable and unstable.63 The
fact that the trial chamber was experiencing difficulties in categorizing the Tutsi group
necessitated this expansion, whether they fit neatly into these categories or not.64 Since
the trial chamber defined an ethnic group as a “group whose members share a common
language or culture,”65 they were unable to distinguish the Tutsis from the Hutus because
the two groups share a language and culture that are essentially the same.66 These two
groups “speak the same Bantu languages, profess the same religions and have common

61

Wang, supra note 3, at 208.
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Prosecutor v. Akayesu, supra note 1, para. 516. (national, ethnic, racial, and religious).
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traditions.”67 Also, the chamber decided that “it is particularly important to respect the
intention of the drafters of the Genocide Convention, which according to the travaux
preparatoires, was patently to ensure the protection of any stable and permanent
group.”68 The court also found that these stable and permanent groups are “determined
by birth.”69 The trial chamber believed that protection of the Genocide Convention was
only excluded from the more mobile groups which a person may join voluntarily
throughout the course of the life, such as political or economic groups.70
An indication that the Tutsis were a stable and permanent group was found in the
fact that prior to 1994 every Rwandan was required to carry an identity card which listed
his ethnic group, that Rwandan laws distinguished among groups of citizens by their
ethnic group, and that these ethnic distinctions were passed down patrilineally.71
Therefore, although the term “ethnic group” may not be technically accurate for the
Hutus and Tutsis, the trial chamber was able to bring them within the protection of the
Genocide Convention and find Akayesu guilty of genocide. Akayesu did not raise this
issue upon appeal.72
There is, however, significant criticism of this decision. The decision clearly goes
beyond the terms of the Convention’s definition of genocide, using the intent of the

67

Maguire, supra note 5 at 51.
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Prosecutor v. Akayesu, supra note 1, at para. 516.
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drafters instead.73 As a general rule, a court should not go beyond the clear meaning of a
treaty except to assist in clarifying ambiguous or obscure terms, or to avoid
interpretations of the treaty that are manifestly absurd or unreasonable.74 In such cases,
the Tribunal may then rely on the travaux preparatoires and the circumstances of the
treaty’s conclusion.75 Tribunals are not allowed to legislate, merely interpret the law.
Such a departure from the language of the Convention risks being seen as judicial
legislation. This is particularly objectionable in the case of a criminal offense, “which
should be subject to restrictive interpretation and respect the rule nullum crimen sine
lege.”76 It has also been stated that the intent of the drafters of the Convention is not as
clear as the Tribunal suggests.77 These complaints may work against future chambers
expanding definitions of crimes within the statute.
This danger is reflected in Prosecutor v. Kayishema78 In this case, Clement
Kayishema and Obed Ruzidana were both charged with genocide in the killing of
thousands of Tutsis. Once again faced with the question of whether the Tutsis were
protected under the Genocide Convention, the court found that the Hutus and the Tutsis
could be considered to share a common ethnicity. However, the court in this case used a
subjective standard to determine that Tutsis were an ethnic group, based upon the legal

73

William A. Schabas, supra note 64, at 380.
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Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, (1979) 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, art. 32. [Reproduced in the
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usage of that distinction by the government of Rwanda.79 Therefore in the view of the
chambers, an ethnic group could be a “group identified as such by others, including
perpetrators of the crimes.80 While not endorsing the analysis of the Akayesu chamber, it
also did not explicitly disagree with it.81 A criticism of this approach is that it places too
much power in the hands of the perpetrator to define his own crime.82
A similar analysis took place within the context of the ICTY, when charges were
brought in the Prosecutor v. Tadic83 for violations of Article II of the ICTY statute which
gives the Tribunal jurisdiction over grave breaches of the 1949 Geneva Conventions.84
This crime is also required to be committed against a member of a protected class.85 The
Appeals Chamber in this case also examined the intent of the drafters of the Geneva
Conventions in order to reach a decision regarding who was protected under the treaty.
The chamber determined that the intent reflected in the treaty was to protect civilians to
the maximum extent possible.86 Therefore, it is the substance of the relations between the
parties and not their legal characterization, which is controlling.87 “In essence, under this
criteria, it does not matter if the victims (Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats) and
79
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Prosecutor v. Kayishema, supra note 57 at 522-530. (Identification cards, etc.).
Id. at 98.
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perpetrator (Bosnian Serb) are technically from the same nationality.”88 In this case, the
Chambers found that the victims were in the hands of armed forces of which they were
not nationals and were therefore “protected persons” under the statute, despite the fact
that they were in fact from the same country as the perpetrators.89
These precedents involving the expansion of the protected groups under the
respective articles of the Statutes show that at least some of the Trial Chambers have
been willing to interpret the Statutes broadly in an effort to achieve justice.
D. Application of the Precedents of the Tribunals to the Crime of Persecution
The ability of the Tribunals to expand their reach beyond the plain meaning of the
Statutes is not unprecedented, although they do not always choose to do so.
“The Tribunal has alternatively acknowledged that it’s jurisprudential and
rulemaking power emanates from the Security Council through the…Statute
and expanded its power beyond what the Statute provides. These
expansions have generally taken three forms: 1) a claim that the ICTY did
not need statutory authority; 2) a claim that it could ignore the Statute to
achieve fairness (usually coupled with dubious statutory interpretation so
that ignoring it did not seem so egregious); and 3) those with either express
or tacit Security Council approval.”90
The first two of these grounds for justifying the expansion of the definitions of the
jurisdiction of the Tribunals are the ones that must be examined for the purposes of this
memorandum as there has clearly not been Security Council approval.
The first ground to be examined is that statutory authority is unnecessary. The
Appeals Chamber in the Tadic case applied the principle of “la competence de la
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competence” to the ICTY Statute. In so doing, the Chamber determined that it had the
inherent power to determine its own jurisdiction.91 Furthermore, the court believed that if
their jurisdiction was absolutely limited to that which had been given to them by the
Security Council, they would be a subsidiary organ of the Security Council.92 In order to
avoid the ex post facto imposition of criminal liability, the jurisdiction of the Tribunals
was limited to those crimes that were based on rules that were beyond any doubt a part of
customary law.93

While the crime of persecution is certainly a part of customary

international law as evidenced by its inclusion in both the ICTY and ICTR Statutes,
“there is no definitive list of persecutory grounds in customary international law.”94 The
fact that the proper discriminatory grounds for bringing charges of persecution is not
limited to those codified in the ICTY and ICTR statutes by customary international law is
given further support by the inclusion of many more grounds in the Rome Charter for the
ICC.95 If the prohibition of persecutions based on ethnic or national grounds is based on
customary international law, a statute would not be necessary to bring charges for this
crime. Therefore, by invoking the principle of “la competence de la competence” the
court could expand their jurisdiction to cover persecutions on ethnic or national grounds.
The second ground to be considered is that the Tribunal is free to ignore the
Statute to achieve fairness. “In these cases, the Tribunal portrays international law as
91
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malleable, with none of the rigidity of national law, and argues that it should be modified
to administer justice fairly. Though expansion is usually justified on fairness-to-thedefendant grounds, a desire to contribute to the development of international law is also a
significant factor.”96 In the Tadic case, the Chamber observed that the ICTY Statute is
“general in nature”, and that it “must be supplemented where advisable, by the rules
which the Judges were mandated to adopt.”97 However, expansion in this case was
generally used to achieve fairness to the defendant. This area is where the precedent
regarding the expansion of the definitions of genocide and grave breaches of the Geneva
Conventions would come into play.

The likely reason that these definitions were

expanded was to achieve fairness.
It would be an injustice if the main group of victims of serious violations of
international law were not protected by the Statutes of the International Criminal
Tribunals that were formed specifically to bring them justice. In the Delalic case, the
ICTY interpreted the Statute by applying
the “literal rule” (giving effect to the plain wording of the Statute), the
“golden rule” (modifying provisions in a logical manner where the plain
wording of the text would lead to “injustice, absurdity, anomaly or
contradiction”) and the “mischief rule” (where the court ascertains
meaning by scrutinizing the provision, its history, prior law and the
circumstances in which it was adopted, and its object and purpose in light
of the “mischief” that the provision was intended to address).98
This same principle should apply to the crime of persecution on ethnic and
national grounds. As the victims would have been considered members of a distinct
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Gregory P. Lombardi, supra note 90 at 891.
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David L. Nersessian, supra note 52 at 240.
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ethnic group within their country, the law should allow justice; otherwise the Statute
would have no effect and would lead to a clearly undesirable result. The main problem
with attempting to use this means to expand the Statute is that since it is typically used to
achieve fairness, it has previously been largely used expand on procedural grounds.99
There is also a possibility that attempting to expand the crime of persecution in
order to protect ethnic and national minority groups could be seen as violating nullem
crimen sine lege. The Statutes of the Tribunals did not claim to set forth new substantive
law, merely to set out the elements of the tribunals’ competence.100 There the success of
this tactic would require a finding that these groups were already protected under
customary international law.
This expansion of the jurisdiction of the Tribunal is the best way to attempt to
secure a conviction for persecution of ethnic or national minorities.

“Ambiguous

provisions should be interpreted so as to accomplish the broad humanitarian goal of
protecting the integrity of human groups.”101 This expansion goes the farthest towards
supplying ongoing justice for the victims of crimes against humanity on these grounds. It
also keeps the process in the hands of the Tribunals and it clearly defines which classes
are protected from persecutions. Unfortunately, it may also be the least likely to succeed.
It also raises the largest issues of unfairness to the defendants. Given the precedents of
the Akayesu and Tadic cases though, it does seem that it might be possible to convince
the Chambers to expand the law to criminalize persecutions on these grounds.

IV.
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Another possible means to secure convictions for persecutions against ethnic or
national minorities would be to allow domestic courts to prosecute for this crime. This
could either be accomplished in Rwandan national courts under domestic law or in
another State under universal jurisdiction. However, this theory raises some very serious
issues which would first have to be addressed.
A. Universal Jurisdiction for Crimes against Humanity
In order for a crime to be tried before the national courts, one of two conditions
must be met: the offense must be a crime within the legal system of the nation in which
the trial is to take place, or it must be a grave breach of international law to which
universal jurisdiction has attached. This policy is a result of the effort in criminal law to
avoid violating the principle of nullum crimen sine lege (no crime without law).
Furthermore, to do otherwise would violate Article 6(2) of Protocol II of the Geneva
Convention which states that “no one shall be held guilty of any criminal offense on
account of any act or omission which did not form a criminal offence, under the law, at
the time when it was committed.”102 However, the Protocol II prohibition of convictions
that violate the principle of nullum crimen sine lege would not prevent conviction for
crimes against humanity as these are already prohibited by customary international
law.103
Crimes against humanity are not a recent development for the assignment of
individual criminal responsibility. In fact, there is a history of their use for more than
102
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fifty years, and it would have at least arguably been possible to use this concept prior to
this if the world had the will even if these crimes had not been reflected in domestic laws.
“More importantly…it does not depend for its enforcement on the degree to which its
standard has been adopted in corresponding municipal legislation over individual
violators without the need for such external references.”104 In short, the core offenses
underlying crimes against humanity are as egregious as to be jus cogens norms, and
therefore the violators of these norms may be brought before any court under the
principle of universal jurisdiction on the theory that the perpetrators have rendered
themselves hostes humani generis.105

In this case, “the deliberate violation of a

fundamental international human right may constitute a crime giving rise to universal
jurisdiction even in the absence of a treaty or convention.”106
The greatest strength supporting the argument that the crime of persecution may
be brought to trial before a national court in addition to an international tribunal is that as
originally formulated in the Nuremberg Charter, persecution is a crime against humanity
“even if not against the laws of the nation where it occurred.”107 As has been stated,
“[r]ights which can be properly classified as jus cogens, i.e., which have universally
binding effect even in the face of contrary state legislation, enjoy the highest status to
which any jurisprudential norm can aspire—non-derogability.”108 There is a presumption
in international law that “an international legal instrument purporting to restate jus cogens
104
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norms is, in fact, consistent with those norms.”109 A consistent pattern of gross violations
of internationally recognized human rights is a violation of customary international law
and systematic racial discrimination is a violation of a jus cogens norm.110 These would
also seem to be a potential definition of persecutions.
Universal jurisdiction over crimes against humanity is considered to be a feature
of customary international law.111 It is presumed that every state has an interest in
exercising jurisdiction since the level of the crime is so egregious. Adolph Eichmann
was tried for crimes against the Jewish people, a crime similar to persecution or genocide,
in Israel under the principle of universal jurisdiction for crimes which occurred before the
creation of that State.112

Few states have the necessary statutes to allow the prosecution

of crimes of universal jurisdiction. However, such a statute would not be necessary in the
case of Rwanda as they would also have territorial jurisdiction.
In order to ascertain the parameters of customary international law, the tribunals
would first examine the plain test, purpose and preparatory work of a treaty. It would use
case law as subsequent practice, and would then reference international authorities.113
Upon analysis of these issues it seems that the prohibition of persecution is in fact a jus
cogens norm, particularly since the severity of the offense must rise to the level of
violations of other crimes against humanity, and would therefore be subject to universal
109
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jurisdiction allowing a national court to take jurisdiction over the crime regardless of
whether it was a violation of national laws.
B. Concurrent Jurisdiction
Following the genocide in Rwanda in 1994, a large number of individuals were in
prison awaiting prosecution.

Rwanda has established four categories of offenders

according to the degree of their culpability. The first category includes leaders and
organizers; the second category includes all others who committed homicides; the third
category includes perpetrators of grave assaults; and the fourth category includes those
who committed property crimes.114 “As of January 1997, Rwanda’s prison population
has grown to over 90,000 virtually all awaiting prosecution for genocide-related crimes.
The caseload of the ICTR is expected to be in the hundreds at most.”115 Clearly there are
many cases that might have theoretically risen to the level that the ICTR could prosecute,
but that the Tribunal lacks to resources to adequately prosecute. In fact, the national
courts of Rwanda have largely taken to relying on plea agreements in order to expedite
the process of disposing of the enormous number of cases before them.116
These genocide related crimes fall under the concurrent jurisdiction of the
government of Rwanda and the ICTR.117 Under the ICTR Statute, the ICTR has primacy
of jurisdiction over the national courts of Rwanda.118 When both the ICTR and the
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national courts of Rwanda have a legal basis for jurisdiction over a case, the ICTR is
entitled, but not obligated, to exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of the national body.119
Additionally, the opinion has been offered that international law has primacy over
national law generally.120
Article 10 of the ICTY Statute discusses the concurrent jurisdiction of the
ICTY.121 Primacy of Article 10 is preserved on non-bis-in-idem, which provides that “no
person shall be tried before a national court if that person has already been tried by the
ICTY, but a person who has been tried by a national tribunal subsequently may be tried
by the ICTY if a number of conditions are met.”122 Under Rule 11 of the Rules of
Procedure for the ICTY, the Tribunal may surrender a defendant to a national court in
which the alleged offense took place for the purpose of standing trial.123 Furthermore,
determinations of any state are not binding upon the Tribunal.124 The conditions under
the statute for a defendant to be tried in the Tribunal after having been tried in a national
court is that: the act for which he was tried was characterized as an ordinary crime, or the
national proceedings were not fair or impartial.125
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The ICTR has an almost identical requirement within its own Statute,126 as well
as in its rules of evidence and procedure.127 There is no evidence in the statute whether
this requirement applies only to the same charged crime, the same acts, or any charged
crime resulting from any act. However, in the ICC Statute it has been made clear that as
long as the conduct being prosecuted for in the Tribunal is different from the conduct that
was prosecuted for in the national court, the case could go forward.128 This analysis may
be applicable in the future, as it has been stated that “the creation of the ICC, for which
the notion of complementarity is central, may well influence the practice of the ICTY”129
Additionally, the recommendation of the United States, which is the most important for
interpreting the Statute, states that the fact that a person has been tried by a State shall not
preclude the trial of that person if the charges did not cover the crimes listed in the
Tribunal’s statute.130 The only requirement is that the Tribunal must take into account
any punishment of that person for the same acts.131 If so, then the Prosecutor could allow
the national court to begin with jurisdiction for the crime of persecution of ethnic or
national minorities, and then take jurisdiction for the other crimes that the defendant
could be charged with.
Among the risks with attempting this course of action include the Chamber
interpreting the Rules of Procedure to mean that a defendant could not be brought back
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before the Tribunal in the event that there is a verdict in the national court, or that the
national courts would take a narrow view of the crime of persecution, instead of giving it
the full weight that it deserves.
There has not been a ruling on whether the Chamber would follow the ICC
method of concurrent jurisdiction, which would allow the defendant to be brought before
the Tribunal after standing trial before the national court for different conduct than that
which forms the basis for prosecution. Therefore, there is a risk that the defendant would
not be able to be brought before the Tribunal at all.

Since the actus reas of the

persecution can be comprised of other crimes against humanity, allowing this crime to be
tried in a national court may prevent the Tribunal from trying any other crimes against
humanity of which the defendant is accused. As this may run counter to the interests of
justice, with a major war criminal being unable to be brought before an international
tribunal and likely being subject to receiving a plea agreement, this course of action may
be undesirable. Rwanda may also be unwilling to prosecute the crime within their courts
since they are already over crowded with defendants awaiting trial for genocide related
crimes.
Even if the defendant is able to be brought back before the Tribunal after a
judgment in national court, this course of action may be undesirable. The possibility
exists that a national court would not give the crime of persecution the full weight that it
deserves. For example, if the individual conduct comprising the persecution is illegal
under the laws of the nation where it occurred, the court may simply look at it as its
component acts rather than the pattern of conduct. That is to say, it may be tried as a
series of domestically illegal acts rather than as a “crime against humanity”. This would
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not be in the interests of justice, as it would not allow for appreciation of the seriousness
of the conduct that only becomes apparent when looking at the entire pattern.
Also, depending on the view of human rights within the country where the
persecution took place, the crime may not be accorded full weight. If the country has a
narrow view of human rights, the pattern of conduct which would normally be considered
persecution within the international system may not lead to a conviction for persecution
or any other crimes. For this reason, persecution can be a dangerous crime to rely on the
national courts to adjudicate. Murder is murder everywhere, but the weight afforded to
basic human rights depends heavily on the domestic system of the country in question.
This means that there is a risk that the crimes in question would not be prosecuted
anywhere.

The danger of justice not being served is particularly troubling as the

discriminatory intent necessary for persecution leads many to the conclusion that this is
the most serious of all of the crimes against humanity.132

V.

Relying on the Unclear Definitions of Protected Groups to Allow

for Convictions
Of the various means to secure convictions for the persecution of ethnic or
national minorities, the most likely to succeed is to rely on the blurred distinctions
between the various groups. Since most members of one group could be found to also be
members of another group, it is possible to find a group that is among the protected
classes, even if this group is not the most accurate description of the victims. This means
has met with great success within the ICTY, but there have been mixed results within the
ICTR.
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A. Definitions of the Protected Groups under the Statutes
For the purpose of the analysis of the Statute, it is important to note the definitions
that the statutes give to the groups that are listed as protected either under genocide or
crimes against humanity. In many cases these definitions are unclear, particularly when
applied to the facts on the ground. For the purposes of this section five groups of
“protected populations” under the Statutes’ provisions are identified: racial groups, ethnic
groups, religious groups, national groups, and political groups will be examined.
1. Racial Groups
One definition of a racial group is “based on the hereditary physical traits often
identified with a geographical region, irrespective of linguistic, cultural, national or
religious factors.”133 Racial group is “an archaic term used to describe what we now
know as Ethnic groups.”134

The Proxmire Act defines a racial group as “a set of

individuals whose identity as such is distinctive in terms of physical characteristics or
biological descent.”135 “Racial groups are defined primarily by the physical appearance
of their members. The ICTR defined them in terms of ‘the hereditary physical traits often
associated with a geographical region, irrespective of linguistic, cultural, national, or
religious factors’. Both of these conceptions accord with prior academic commentary.
Drost, for example, notes that the word ‘racial…refer[s] mainly to external, physical
features and appearance…’”136
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2. Ethnic Groups
According to the Akayesu decision, an ethnic group is defined as “a group whose
members share a common culture or language.”137 They can also be “a group which
distinguishes itself, as such (self-identification); or a group identified as such by
others.”138 This group is “similar in many respects to a national or racial group.”139 The
Proxmire Act defines them as a “set of individuals whose identity as such is distinctive in
terms of common cultural traditions or heritage.”140 This view accords with both the
travaux and prior academic writing, which indicate that the term ‘ethnical’ incorporates
the social, linguistic, and cultural aspects of the group at issue.”141
3. Religious Groups
The Akayesu Trial Chamber found that a “religious group is one whose members
share the same religion, denomination or mode of worship.”142 This appears to be a
functional definition grounded in the objective practices of group members.

The

Proxmire Act accounts for the subjective belief system of group members and defines a
religious group as one whose members have a “common religious creed, beliefs,
doctrines, practices or rituals.”143

There is room for controversy over whether a

nonreligious or an atheistic group qualifies for protection under the Convention. An
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atheistic group could presumably be comprised of individuals from a variety of faiths
who rejected their religious heritage…”144
4. National Groups
The Trial Chamber in the Akayesu decision stated that based on an opinion by the
ICJ “a national group is defined as a collection of people who are perceived to share a
legal bond based on common citizenship, coupled with reciprocity of rights and
duties.”145
The Proxmire Act defines a national group as one “whose identity as such is
distinctive in terms of nationality or national origins.”146

“The implication of this

formulation is that any individual can belong to at least two national groups
simultaneously: the nation of birth origin and the nation(s) of current citizenship. In
Akayesu, the ICTR defined a national group as ‘a collection of people who are perceived
to share a common legal bond based on common citizenship, coupled with reciprocity of
rights and duties.’ Thus, group members’ personal conception of their own nationality
(whether by affiliation or otherwise) is not dispositive. The focus on the legal aspects of
nationality (on ‘rights and duties’ and ‘a common legal bond’) indicates that a collection
of individuals organized on the basis of political beliefs is insufficient to establish
nationality without some additional legal interest tying them together. This accords with
the intent of the…drafters to distinguish national groups from political groups.”147
5. Political Groups
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Political groups lack as substantial of a definition as the other protected groups
under the statute. This is largely due to the fact that these groups were intentionally left
out of the Genocide Convention since they are not a “stable and permanent group”.
“Political grounds include party political beliefs and political ideology.”148 Although
national groups have been distinguished from political groups, it seems likely that a
political group which overlaps with a national group would enjoy the protections of both.
For the purposes of the Statutes, it would seem the term “political group” would have the
meaning which it is given in common usage, a group of individuals who share a common
political ideology.

In these cases, common ideology would not necessarily mean

identical. The key factor would likely be by which political ideology the victim would
identify themselves with. The group could also be a negative one. That is, it could
consist of all of those who oppose state policy.
Another possibility is that a political group would not necessarily have to share a
common ideology, but would rather be more of a reflection of socio-economic status.
That is to say, that if one class is the ruling class and another is a “subordinate” class; any
persecutions based on this distinction may be considered to be based on political grounds.
B. The Ambiguity and Overlap of Groups Definitions as Applied to the Facts
It is important when applying the Statutes for the Tribunals to note that the
ambiguity of some of these definitions of “protected groups” and the overlap that is
inherent to these groups although on paper they are distinct categories, this can lead to
confusion and a possible inability to fulfill the intent of the drafters of the Statutes. “To
recognize that there exists discrimination on racial or ethnic grounds, it is not necessary
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to presume or posit the existence of race or ethnicity itself as a scientifically objective
fact.”149 The fact that individuals subjectively believe that either race or ethnicity exist is
enough.
For example, in the case of the Tutsis in Rwanda there are several categories
under which they could be included. They can be considered a racial group, since “there
are slight physiological differences between [the] groups: the Tutsi are generally tall and
thin with facial features resembling those of Ethiopians or Somalis, while the Hutu tend
to be shorter and stouter.”150 This distinction has become somewhat less clear over the
years due to intermarriage between Hutus and Tutsis.151
Hutus and Tutsis could also be considered to be ethnic groups due to the
aforementioned legal status of the groups within Rwanda itself as ethnic groups. In fact,
the Trial Chamber in the Akayesu case held that due to this legal status and the selfidentification of Rwandan witnesses as members of an ethnic group, that Hutus and Tutsi
constituted separate ethnic groups. Again, however, the Hutus and Tutsis do not meet the
strict definition of ethnic groups as the ICTR has described them.152 Therefore, this
grouping is not entirely accurate for use in the Tribunals definitions.
They could also be considered to be political groups. Although there is no clear
sign that the Hutu and the Tutsi maintained political ideologies distinct from one another,
there is a possibility that they were in fact distinct political groups. This is based in part
149
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on the fact that for a large portion of Rwandan history, the minority Tutsis were the
ruling political class. The Hutus had achieved power sometime before the plane crash
that killed the President in 1994. It was at this time that the atrocities in Rwanda began.
It seems that they were at least partially motivated by resentment brought about by years
of minority rule.153 Ethnic tensions were also used by those in power to carry out plans
to avoid power sharing.154 Some killings of moderate Hutus were based on the fact that
they supported power sharing with the Tutsis. This may be enough to establish the Hutus
and Tutsis as distinct political groups. There does not seem to have been national or
religious ground for the atrocities in Rwanda.
A similar lack of clarity can be found in the Former Yugoslavia in the Tadic
case.155 In the case where the Bosnian Croats and Bosnian Muslims were considered to
be of a different nationality than the Bosnian Serbs, they could also be considered to be
respectively, a different ethnicity and different religious group as well.
C. Application of this Principle to Case Law
The were several cases within the ICTR where charges were brought against a
Hutu defendant for persecution against a Tutsi victim. Despite the tendency of judges
within their judgments to refer to the Tutsis as an ethnic group, there has been a
demonstrated ability to obtain convictions for persecution. In the Ruggiu case, the court
referred to the Tutsis as an ethnic group, but Ruggiu was convicted after pleading guilty
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to persecution on racial and political grounds.156

Ruggiu was also convicted for

statements made against Belgians. The judgment mentions political or racial grounds.
However, some of the statements seem as though they could have been made on national
grounds instead. For example, he accused Belgium of shooting down the President’s
plane, and he also pointed out that three whites were killed with the RPF but they were
not just any whites, they were Belgians.157
In the Semanza case, the defendant was acquitted of persecution.158 However,
although the charge was brought for persecution on political grounds the court held that
the prosecution did not adequately explain the deaths of Hutus on the scene, since the
primary target was the Tutsi ethnic group. The Trial Chamber also specifically rejected
the prosecutor’s assertion that persecution had occurred on ethnic grounds, and noted that
national and ethnic grounds are not included among the protected groups.159
In the Prosecutor v. Simic case, the Trial Chamber examined the law of
persecution. Discussing the protected groups under the Statute, the Chamber held
the targeted group does not only comprise persons who personally carry
the (religious, racial, or political) criteria of the group. The targeted group
must be interpreted broadly, and may, in particular include such persons
who are defined by the perpetrators as belonging to the victim group due
to their close affiliations or sympathies for the victim group.160
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In the ICTY, there has been more success in obtaining conviction for persecution.
However, this has been aided by the existence of persecutions against Bosnian Muslims.
The law in the ICTY seems to have been stretched to accommodate the persecution of
Bosnian Croats as well however.
In the Kupreskic case, the court found the defendants guilty of the persecution of
Bosnian Muslims.161 Although the Muslims would seem to be a religious group under
the common definition of the term, they were widely considered to be an ethnic group as
well. Dusko Tadic was also convicted of persecution before the ICTY for discriminatory
actions taken against Bosnian Croats and Bosnian Muslims, again both arguably ethnic
groups.162 This was allowable as a political persecution since they were committed as
part of a political campaign to commit ethnic cleansing.163 There have been several other
cases in which a Trial Chamber found a defendant guilty of persecution in the ICTY, a
total of eleven cases ending in conviction. Therefore, it seems clear that the ICTY is not
having difficulty defining the protected groups under the Statute in such a way as to
protect the victims of persecution.
D. Practical Effects of Relying on the Overlap of Definitions
It would be possible to convict the leadership of the Hutu ethnic group of
persecution under the theory that they were persecuting against the Tutsi ethnic group in
an effort to maintain political power or that they were attempting to persecute a political
group that largely consisted of Tutsi.164 “Difficulty in constructing a definition does not
161
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render an expression useless, particularly from a legal point of view.”165 In fact, this
ambiguity leaves considerable discretion in the hands of the Trial Chambers, which
permits them to adapt to the changing social and political climate.166 These five groupsnational, ethnic, racial, religious, and political- “necessary involve a degree of
subjectivity because their meaning is determined in a social context.”167 The terms “not
only overlap, they also help to define each other, operating much as four corner posts that
delimit an area within which a myriad of groups…find protection.”168
The Semanza Judgment stated that a determination of whether a group is
protected should be assessed on a case-by-case basis by looking at the objective context
and the subjective perceptions of the perpetrators.169 Also, according to the Rutaganda
judgment, each of the groups must be “assessed in light of the particular political, social,
and cultural context.”170 It has also been observed that
The International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination prohibits racial discrimination.

In that convention, the term “racial

discrimination” means any “distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference based on
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race…or national or ethnic origin.”171 This suggests that the definition of “race” in
international law may be broad enough to include ethnic and national minorities.
Relying on the overlap of the definition of the protected groups is a dangerous
route to take. As was shown in the Semanza case, a Chamber can dismiss a count if they
do not feel that the facts have been adequately explained by the prosecution to account
for discrepancies caused by the overlapping definitions.172

Therefore, it would be

important to clearly explain how the evidence leads to the conclusion that the victim
population belongs to a particular protected group despite the fact that they also belong to
a particular unprotected group. If this cannot be adequately explained, this tactic is likely
to fail. Also, mistake of fact by the defendant of which group a victim belongs to may
not be enough to bring a conviction.173
However, it must be possible to defeat an argument of innocence based on the
blurred distinctions between groups. If decisions similar to Semanza continue to come
about, it would be a challenge to prosecute for persecution at all. The lack of clarity
about which group the Hutus and Tutsis belong in could allow the defendants to argue
that they focused their campaign on an unprotected group rather than a protected
group.174

VI. Application of Rwandan Treaty Law in the ICTR
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The international tribunal may apply international agreements binding upon the
conflicting parties. This decision was reached in the Tadic Decision on the Defense
Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction.175 According to this decision the sole
purpose of the Tribunal applying customary international law was to avoid violating the
principle of nullum crimen sine lege in the event that a party did not adhere to a specific
treaty. Therefore, “it follows that the International Tribunal is authorized to apply, in
addition to customary international law, any treaty which: (i) was unquestionably binding
on the parties at the time of the alleged offense; and (ii) was not in conflict with or
derogating from peremptory norms of international law.”176 For example, Rwanda had
acceded by legislative decree to the Convention on Genocide177 Rwanda was also a party
to the ICCPR, CERD, and ICESC.178 Under the principle of succession, any treaties that
the previous government had entered into would be binding on the new government, and
these treaties would be binding at the time of the violations. Therefore, prosecutions
could be brought before the Tribunal for the violations of these treaties. This would not
technically allow conviction for persecution, but would rather allow conviction for the
same acts as if the charge was for persecution under the Statute.

VII.

Conclusion
The ability of the chambers of the ICTR and ICTY to determine their own

jurisdiction under the principle of competence de la competence, as was laid out in the
Tadic case, combined with the prior extension of the protected populations of the crime
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of Genocide and Grave Breaches of the Geneva Conventions leads to the conclusion that
it would be possible to extend the protections afforded under the Crimes Against
Humanity section of the ICTR and ICTY Statutes to include ethnic and national
minorities in an effort to satisfy the intent of the statute.
Furthermore, the Tribunals would be able to surrender a defendant to the national
courts in order that they could be prosecuted for the crime of persecution on ethnic and
national grounds. However, there would be limitations to this possibility. There is a
requirement that a defendant not be tried for a crime for which he had previously been
convicted of in the International Tribunals. In addition, there would be a requirement that
the persecution rise to the level of customary international law which would grant the
nation the ability to try the crime under universal jurisdiction. This would be necessary
since it would be unlikely that the nation would have a law against persecution on a
domestic level, although they may have crimes against the individual upon which the
persecution is comprised.
The final means to obtain a conviction for persecution against an ethnic or
national minority would be to maintain the present course of indictments. Given the
unclear and even overlapping nature of the definitions of the protected groups under the
Statutes of the Tribunals, the ethnic and national minorities would likely be protected
under another category of protected class.
Given the inherent limitations of the second two possibilities of obtaining
convictions for the persecution of ethnic and national minorities, the best course of action
would be to attempt to expand the protected classes as was done for the crime of
genocide.
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However, one of these means must be successful as “the Statute for the Tribunal
was drafted specifically for application to the Rwanda events and…was written with the
ultimate goal of trying and convicting those clearly responsible for orchestrating the
killing of hundreds of thousands of people.”179 The Tribunal must keep this purpose in
mind as it interprets the words of its Statute.
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